Standards bodies have been addressing the key-wrap problem, a cryptographic goal that has never re ceived a provable-security treatment. In response, we provide one, giving definitions, constructions, and proofs. We suggest that key-wrap's goal is security in the sense of deterministic authenticated-encryption (DAE), a notion that we put forward. We also provide an alternative notion, a pseudorandom injection (PRI), which we prove to be equivalent. We provide a DAE construction, SIV, analyze its concrete security, de velop a blockcipher-based instantiation of it, and suggest that the method makes a desirable alternative to the schemes of the X9.102 draft standard. The construction incorporates a method to turn a PRF that operates on a string into an equally efficient PRF that operates on a vector of strings, a problem of independent inter est. Finally, we consider IV-based authenticated-encryption (AE) schemes that are maximally forgiving of repeated IVs, a goal we formalize as misuse-resistant AE. We show that a DAE scheme with a vector-valued header, such as SIV, directly realizes this goal.
Introduction
The American Standards Committee Working Group X9F1 has proposed four key-wrap schemes in a draft standard known as ANS X9.102, and NIST has promulgated a request for comments on the proposal [13] . The S/MIME working group of the IEEE had earlier adopted a key-wrap scheme [17] , and their discussions on this topic go back to at least 1997 [37] . NIST is considering specifying a key-wrap mechanism in their own series of recommendations [M. Dworkin, personal communications] . But despite all this, the key-wrap goal would seem to be essentially unknown to the cryptographic community. No published paper analyzes any key-wrap scheme, and there is no formal definition for key wrap in the literature, let alone any proven-secure scheme. Consequently, the goal of this paper is to put the key-wrap problem on a proper, provable-security footing. In the process, we will learn quite a bit that's new about authenticated-encryption (AE).
Before proceeding it may be useful to give a very informal description of the key-wrap goal, echoing the wording in [13, p. 1] . A key-wrap scheme is a kind of shared-key encryption scheme. It aims to provide "privacy and integrity protection for specialized data such as cryptographic keys, . . . without the use of nonces" (meaning counters or random bits). So key-wrap's raison d'être is to remove AE's reliance on a nonce or random bits. At least in the context of transporting cryptographic keys, a deterministic scheme should be just as good as a probabilistic one, anyway. Another goal of key wrap is to provide "integrity protection . . . for cleartext associated data, . . . which will typically contain control information about the wrapped key" [13, p. 1] .
CONTRIBUTIONS. We begin with a critique of the X9.102 key-wrap schemes, identifying the basic charac teristics of each of the four algorithms. Overall, we find the proposed mechanisms somewhat disappointing in terms of usage restrictions, efficiency, and foundations. That said, we break none of the four schemes, and we owe this work to their existence. See Section 2 and Appendix A.
Guided by the proposed schemes, we offer a definition for what a key-wrap scheme should do. We call the goal deterministic authenticated-encryption (DAE). A thesis underlying our work is that the goal of a key-wrap scheme is DAE. In a DAE scheme, encryption deterministically turns a key, a header, and a message into a ciphertext. The header (which may be absent, a string, or even a vector of strings) is authenticated but not encrypted. To define security, the adversary is presented either a real encryption oracle and a real decryption oracle (both are deterministic), or else a bogus encryption oracle that just returns random bits and a bogus decryption oracle that always returns an indication of invalidity. For a good DAE scheme, the adversary should be unable to distinguish these possibilities. See Section 3.
Next we provide a DAE construction, SIV. (The acronym stands for Synthetic IV, where IV stands for Initialization Vector.) The construction combines a conventional IV-based encryption scheme (eg, CTR mode [27] ) and a special kind of pseudorandom function (PRF)-one that takes a vector of strings as input. To encrypt, apply the PRF to the header and the message and use the result as the IV of the encryption scheme. We prove that SIV is a good DAE, assuming its components are secure. See Section 4.
In practice one would want to realize SIV from a blockcipher, and so we show how to turn a PRF f that operates on a single string into a PRF f * that takes a vector of strings. Under our S2V construction, the cost of computing the PRF f * = S2V[f ] on a vector X = (X 1 , . . . , X n ) is at most the total cost to compute f on each component X i , and it can be considerably less, as the contribution from a component X i can be precomputed if it is to be held constant. See Section 5.
For a concrete alternative to the X9.102 schemes, we suggest to instantiate SIV using modes CTR and CMAC * = S2V [CMAC] , where CTR is counter mode [27] and CMAC is an arbitrary-input-length variant of the CBC MAC [28] . The specified mechanism removes unnecessary usage restrictions, improves efficiency, and provides provable security. See Section 6.
Applications of DAEs go beyond the wrapping of keys. Many IV-based encryption schemes, such as CBC, require an adversarially unpredictable IV. Experience has shown that implementers and protocol designers often supply an incorrect IV, such as a constant or counter. In a misuse-resistant AE scheme the aim is to do as well as possible with whatever IV is provided. We formalize this goal and show that a DAE scheme that takes a vector valued header provides an immediate solution: just regard the IV as one component of the header. Adopting this viewpoint, SIV can be regarded as an IV-based AE scheme, one as efficient with respect to blockcipher calls as conventional two-pass AE schemes like CCM [29] but more resilient to IV misuse. See Section 7.
Finally, we give an alternative characterization of DAEs. A pseudorandom injection (PRI) is like a blockcipher except that the ciphertext may be longer than the plaintext (also, the message space may be richer than {0, 1} n for some fixed n, and a header may be provided). We prove PRIs equivalent to DAEs, up to a term that is negligible when the PRI is adequately length-increasing. Our definition of DAE merges the traditionally separate privacy and authenticity requirements of an AE scheme. It is possible to split the definition into separate privacy and authenticity goals and require both. Doing this yields an equivalent definition. Similarly, the separate privacy and authenticity requirements normally used to define AE [6, 8, 19, 20, 31, 33] can be merged into a single, unified goal. The all-in-one approach for defining AE seems to us simpler and more elegant than giving separate privacy and authenticity definitions and then asking for both. See Appendix B.
A reason for doing key wrap (DAE) instead of conventional (probabilistic) AE is the intuition that, if the plaintext carries a key, there shouldn't be any need to inject additional randomness into the encryption process. One can formalize and prove this intuition, establishing, in effect, the semantic security of DAE for the context in which keys are embedded into plaintexts. A DAE scheme cannot by itself achieve semantic security because it is deterministic-we are saying that a random enough message space compensates for this, letting you recover the equivalent of semantic security. See Appendix C.
Besides SIV we also provide a second construction, one that uses different primitives. The pad-then encipher scheme, PTE, is based on an enciphering scheme (ie, a length-preserving encryption scheme, like CMC [16] ). One pads the plaintext (eg, appending 0-bits) before enciphering. We prove the security of PTE. We investigate the pad-then-encipher is the paradigm because it seems to us the most natural approach to solving the key-wrap problem, as well as the approach that underlies two of the X9.102 schemes. See Appendix D.
ROADMAP. Given the number of new acronyms, definitions, and schemes introduced in this paper, the table of Figure 1 may provide a helpful summary. For the security notions, lower-case labels (eg, dae) are used as a superscript for advantage measures (eg, Adv dae ) while their upper-case counterpart (eg, DAE) are used Π in English prose. Our table omits mention of notions that are standard or whose mention is confined to the appendices.
WHY THIS GOAL? There are two main reasons to prefer DAE over conventional (probabilistic or stateful) AE. First, DAE saves one from having to introduce random bits or state in contexts where these measures are infeasible or unnecessary. Relatedly, DAE saves on bandwidth, since no nonce or random value need be sent.
That said, in many contexts where one would think to use key wrap, one can use a conventional AE scheme, instead. This does not make studying the key-wrap problem pointless. First, it clarifies the relationship between key wrap and conventional AE. Second, DAE leads to misuse-resistant AE, and methods that achieve this aim make practical alternatives to conventional (not misuse-resistant) two-pass AE methods. Finally, practitioners have already "voted" for key-wrap by way of protocol-design and standardization efforts, and it is simply not productive to say "use a conventional AE scheme" after this option has been rejected. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF HEADERS. We emphasize that our formalization of DAEs includes a header (also called a tweak or associated-data). For cryptographic practice, allowing a header seems to be almost essential. Network security protocols require sending packets only portions of which are encrypted, but all of which must be authenticated and bound together. Good security practice requires keys to be bound to control information such as expiration date and permitted usage, and the binding of keys to such control information has strongly informed security architecture (eg, IBM's cryptographic control vectors [25] ). Regarding headers as vectors facilitates both efficiency advantages and a cleaner abstraction boundary.
FURTHER RELATED WORK. AE goals were formalized over a series of papers [6, 8, 20, 31, 33] . The idea of binding the encryption process to unencrypted strings is folklore, with recent work in this direction includ ing [23, 31, 36] . Bellare and Rogaway [8] investigate the paradigm of adding randomness or redundancy to a plaintext and then enciphering it, an approach related to the ideas and results of Appendices C and D. Rus sell and Wong [35] introduce a completely different approach for dealing with the encryption of low-entropy messages, and Dodis and Smith [12] extend this entropy-based approach. Phan and Pointcheval [30] study relationships among security notions for conventional (length-preserving and headerless) ciphers. The SIV construction resembles the AE scheme EAX [9] . A less ambitious relaxation on IV requirements than that formalized as misuse-resistant encryption is given in [32] . The proceedings version of this paper was published as [34] .
The Draft X9.10Standard
Four key-wrap schemes are defined in the draft ANS X9.102 standard [13] . The schemes are called AESKW and TDKW (which are essentially the same scheme, the former using AES and the later using triple-DES), AKW1, and AKW2. Scheme AESKW is based on a six-round, non-standard Feistel network. It was first proposed by NIST and is pictured and specified in Figure 7 . Scheme AKW1 involves two layers of CBC encryption and one application of SHA1. It was developed by the S/MIME working group of the IETF [17] and is pictured in Figure 8 . Scheme AKW2 involves a CBC encryption layer and a CBC MAC layer. It was designed to accommodate legacy financial-services devices and is pictured in Figure 9 .
EXPLANATION OF SUMMARY TABLE. Here and in Figure 2 we summarize basic properties of the X9.102 schemes [13] ; see Appendix A for further discussion. The columns represent three of the four schemes (TDKW is omitted because of its similarity to AESKW). Let us explain the meaning of the table's rows. Goal: This is our understanding of the mechanism's aim. Schemes AESKW and TDKW seem intended to achieve DAE, the focus of this paper. We don't know if the schemes actually achieve this goal (we expect that they do). Scheme AKW1 is described as a probabilistic scheme that aims to achieve (probabilistic) AE, the original notion of AE put forward in [6, 8, 20] . But we explain in Appendix A why we view AKW1 as a peculiar approach for trying to achieve probabilistic AE. Scheme AKW1 seems to reflect no single and ascertainable cryptographic goal (this sometimes happens in committee-based design). Scheme AKW2 achieves only a specialized (not of general interest) notion of deterministic privacy, along with a deterministic version of authenticity-of-ciphertexts. The combination of these aims is substantially weaker than the goal of being a DAE. Message space: The message space over which the scheme is defined. Header space: The space of headers (also called tweaks or associated data) over which the scheme is defined. The target forging probability asserted by the spec. We are not asserting that the scheme actually achieves this value. Maxqueries: The maximum number of plaintext values that may be encrypted in an implementation compliant with the spec. We are not asserting that the scheme is actually secure up to this value. Overhead: The computational overhead, measured in blockcipher calls per block of data (message or header). Scheme AKW1 incurs additional overhead for applying SHA1 to the message. Key usage: The number of blockcipher keys that key the blockcipher calls. Parallelizable? Can the computationtime of the mechanism be arbitrarily sped up by adding additional hardware? Preprocess header? Can a fixed header be cryptographically processed just once, as opposed to dealing with it for each and every message? Expedited auth? Is it faster to see if a ciphertext is inauthentic than to fully decrypt it? Provably secure? Does the mechanism enjoy any provable-security guarantee? That is, has a proof of security been offered, under standard or reasonable assumptions, that the mechanism achieves some well-defined and desirable goal?
INTERPRETATION. Given Figure 2 and the associated discussion in Appendix A, our conclusion is that none of the X9.102 algorithms are mature. Most severely, none has been proven secure-and, prior to this paper, there was not even a clear target for a security proof. Each scheme has multiple problems from among the following: a restricted message space; an inability to handle an associated header; a restricted header space; ciphertext lengths that grow with the header length (even though the header is only authenticated); a large number of blockcipher calls; mysterious aspects of the construction (eg, the byte-reversals or xoring-in counters); and use of cryptographic primitives beyond a blockcipher. For a modern encryption scheme one might reasonably hope for a formally defined and provably achieved security goal, an aesthetic construction coming out of an enunciated paradigm, message headers being supported and the message space and header space being large and natural sets, message expansion of some fixed value, one or two blockcipher calls per block, and further efficiency characteristics (like being able to cheaply handle static headers). That said, we do not mean to be overly negative about the X9.102 schemes. We have not broken any of them, and the six-round Feistel-network of AESKW/TDKW could have beyond-birthday-phenomenon security. The standardization effort has engendered our own work, and it is very hard to design a correct key-wrap scheme prior to having supporting definitions and results. Finally, it is hard to design a correct key-wrap scheme if the � � � � abstraction boundary one is thinking in terms of is a blockcipher, too low-level a tool to make a convenient conceptual starting point.
DAE Security
$ NOTATION. For a distribution S let S ← S mean that S is selected randomly from S (if S is a finite set the assumed distribution is uniform). All strings are binary strings. When X and Y are strings we write XIY * for their concatenation. When X ∈ {0, 1} is a string |X| is its length and, if
is the substring running from its i th to j th characters, or the empty string ε otherwise. By a vector we mean * * a sequence of zero or more strings, and we write {0, 1} for the space of all vectors. We write a vector as 
It is possible to disentangle the privacy and authenticity notions in the DAE definition, defining separate notions for deterministic privacy and deterministic authenticity. We do this in Appendix B, and explain why asking for both of these conditions is equivalent to DAE. While the traditional approach for defining AE has been to split the goal into two separate properties, the unified definition seems to us nicer and more succinct.
We point out that the DAE notion does not formalize the idea that the party that produces a valid ciphertext (a value that decrypts to something other than ⊥) necessarily knows the underlying key K. One could formalize this, but it would not coincide with DAE. Sometimes the key-wrap goal has been described in these terms. We suspect that when security-designers speak of having to know the key in order to produce a valid ciphertext what they typically mean is not a proof of knowledge, but just the inability for a party to produce a valid ciphertext in the absence of the key. It is the latter notion that is well captured by our DAE definition. is syntactically similar to a DAE but in this context the header space H is a set of strings and is renamed the IV space, IV. We expect only privacy in a conventional IV-based encryption scheme, and demand a random IV. This makes the security notion rather weak, but sufficient for our purposes. The following definition captures the desired notion.
Fix a conventional IV-based encryption scheme Π = (K, E, D) with IV-space IV = {0, 1} n . For simplicity, assume Π is length-preserving. Let E $ be the probabilistic algorithm defined from E that, on input K ∈ K and 
where the $(·) oracle, on input M , returns a random string of length n + |M |. We assume that the adversary never asks a query M outside of the message space X of Π.
ARBITRARY-INPUT PSEUDORANDOM FUNCTIONS. Fix nonempty sets K and X , the first being finite or oth erwise endowed with a distribution and the second being finite or countably infinite. A pseudorandom function
be the set of all functions from X to Y and let Func(X , n) = Func(X , {0, 1} n ). Regarding a function as the key, n we can consider Func(X , n) to be a PRF; to each X ∈ X associate a random string in {0, 1} . Let A be an adversary. The advantage of A in violating the pseudorandomness of F is
F
It is tacitly assumed that the adversary has a mechanism of naming points in X by strings; if X ⊆ {0, 1} * then a string names itself, but if X is not a set of strings then points of X are encoded as strings in some natural way. Our definition of PRFs is unusual for allowing the input X to be arbitrary (possibly not a string). * * n THE SIV CONSTRUCTION. Let F :
be a conven tional IV-based encryption scheme with IV-length n and message space X . We write
2 and the encryption and decryption algorithms are as illustrated and defined in Figure 3 .
We will now show that if F is PRF-secure and Π is IND$-secure then D Π = SIV[F, Π] is DAE-secure. The intuition behind the proof is this. If any bit of the header H or plaintext X is new then the string IV will look like a random string and so IV I C will be difficult to distinguish from random bits. On decryption, the adversary must create a new (H, Y ) where Y = IV I C. Let's imagine giving the adversary the corresponding plaintext X for free. Now (H, X) is new because (H, X) determines (H, Y ) and the adversary is not allowed to decipher values that it trivially knows the decipherment of. But if (H, X) is new then IV ' is adversarially unpredictable and so its chance of being equal to IV is only about 2 −n . In the following result we write Time Π (μ), where Π = (K, E, D) is an IV-based encryption scheme and $ μ > 0 is an integer, for the sum of the worst-case times: to select K ← K, to compute E IV on inputs of total K IV length μ, and to compute D on inputs of total length μ. Here, by convention, "time" means actual running 
What is more, B and D run in time at most t ' = t + Time Π (μ) + cμ for some absolute constant c and ask at mostueries, these of total length μ. * *
Proof:
The proof proceeds in two stages. First we consider the DAE scheme
(replacing the function F K1 with a random function ρ ∈ Func({0, 1} , n)). Then we extend this to account for the insecurity of the PRF F .
Denote the forward and reverse algorithms associated to G as G ρ, K2 and G −1 , with (ρ, K2) being the key.
ρ,K2
Let δ = Adv dae (A) and q = q L + q R and μ = μ L + μ R where q L and q R are the number of left and right oracle G queries, these totaling μ L and μ R bits, respectively. With the obvious simplifications in notation we have
where p 1 and p 2 represent the corresponding parenthesized expressions; it remains to bound these quantities. 
Π
To bound p 1 consider giving the key K2 to the adversary and then asking it to carry out its distinguishing task. As this can only make the task easier we may assume
We can assume without loss of generality that A halts and outputs 1 as soon as a right-oracle query returns something other than ⊥. Under this assumption, encryption queries are useless for distinguishing between these two oracle pairs, as prior to the right oracle returning M � ⊥ both pairs behave as G ρ,K2 (·, ·), ⊥(·, ·). = Hence p 1 is bounded by the probability that A asks a right-oracle
ρ,K2 IV
Examining the algorithm for G −1 we see that this occurs only when ρ(H, X) = IV , where
(with Y having been parsed into IV and C). Since the adversary is given the key K2, it can compute D (C)
K2
for any strings IV, C of its choosing. In particular, when it asks a right-oracle query (H, Y ) it knows what is the input to the random function ρ and what is the target output IV . But under our assumption that A never queries its right oracle (H, Y ) when some left-oracle query (H, X) returned Y , either the input (H, X) is new, or the target IV is new. Thus, the probability that ρ(H, X) = IV is at most 1/2 n for each right-oracle query, and we conclude that
For the second part of the proof note that 
When A halts with output bit b,
for some random key K1, and
and rearranging gives the result.
Enriching a PRF to take Vectors of Strings as Input: The S2V Construction
THE GOAL. Traditionally, a pseudorandom function (PRF) takes a single string as input: under the control of * a key K, a PRF f maps a string X ∈ {0, 1} into a string f K (X). But SIV uses a non-traditional PRF-a * * function F that, under the control of a key K, maps a vector of strings X = (X 1 , . . . , X m ) ∈ {0, 1} into a string F K (X). Let us call a PRF that takes a string as input an sPRF (string-input PRF) and a PRF that takes a vector of strings as input a vPRF (vector-input PRF). This section is about efficient ways to turn an sPRF f into a vPRF f * .
At first glance it might seem like there'd be little to say about sPRF-to-vPRF conversion: there's an obvious approach for solving the problem, and it's obviously correct. Namely, encode any vector of strings X = (X 1 , . . . , X ) into a single string (X) and apply the sPRF to that, f * (X) = f K ((X)). By encode we mean m K any reversible, easily-computed map of a vector of strings into a single one, say
where N i = |X i | 64 is the length of X i encoded into 64 bits (assume that |X i | < 2 64 for all i). The problem with making a vPRF in such a way is a diminution of efficiency. First, computing f * (X) may take longer than K the total time to compute f K (X i ) for each component X i since we have added 64m bits for length annotation.
(As an example, if f = CMAC-AES then we are doubling the time to MAC X = (X 1 ) where X 1 is 16 bytes. CMAC was designed to avoid any unnecessary blockcipher calls and it seems a shame to squander this effort with sloppy sPRF-to-vPRF conversion.) Second, even if some components of X stay fixed (say X 2 is constant), we must still re-process the entire encoded string each time we compute f * at a new value.
K
Third, the mechanism is not parallelizable; one cannot process X i until one is done processing X i−1 . Fourth, the assumption that |X i | < 2 64 , while reasonable in practice, is artificial and potentially wasteful, yet use of a stingier encoding will lead to greater complexity. Finally, the given encoding disrupts word alignment: if, for example, the first argument is one byte and all subsequent arguments are multiples of eight bytes, an implementation will now be dealing with non-word-aligned data. Fixing this problem by a smarter encoding will lead to increased complexity. We aim to do sPRF-to-vPRF conversion in a way that fixes the problems above.
NOTATION. Fix a value n ≥ 2. Let 0 = 0 n and 1 = 0 n−1 1 and 2 = 0 n−2 10. These are regarded as points n in finite field F 2 n represented using a primitive polynomial in the customary way. For S ∈ {0, 1} let 2S mean the n-bit string representing the product of 2 and S. This can be computed with a left shift of S followed by a conditional xor. By 2 i S we mean to do this multiplication by 2 a total of i times. By N ⊕ end X ("xor into-the-end") we mean to xor the n-bit string N into the end of the string X, which will have at least n bits;
The left side shows the case for |X 4 | ≥ n, the right side for
By X10 * we mean X10 i where i ≥ 0 is the least number such that |X| + 1 + i is divisible by n. * n THE S2V CONSTRUCTION. Let f : K × {0, 1} → {0, 1} be an sPRF. We construct from it the vPRF * *
n is specified and illustrated in Figure 4 . The special treatment of the last component of input, X m , is to handle the case where |X m | < n. The construction has the desired efficiency characteristics. The time to compute f * (X) is essentially the sum of the times to compute f K (X i ) K on each component; in particular, when f = CMAC, say, the number of blockcipher calls to compute f * (X) K is the sum of the number of blockcipher calls to compute each f K (X i ). Also, one can preprocess invariant components so that the time to compute f * (X) will not significantly depend on them. The computation of f * K is on-line (assuming that f itself is on-line); in particular, the component lengths need not be known in ad vance. Word alignment is not disrupted. And the scheme is parallelizable: different arguments can be acted on simultaneously, so f * will be parallelizable if f is. In a related effort we have proven the following result. The complexity-theoretic analog of Theorem 3 follows in the usual way. We only prove security when queries are restricted to vectors with n − 1 or fewer components. In practice n ≥ 64 well exceeds the number of components in a vector of associated data, making the restriction irrelevant. The proof appears in Appendix E. * Theorem 3 Let f = Func({0, 1} , n) and f * = S2V[f ]. Let A be an adversary that asks at most q ≥ 3 vector-valued queries having p components in all, and each vector having fewer than n components. Then
The complexity-theoretic statement for the security of f * follows from the information-theoretic statement in the standard way, so we omit a proof of the following: *
n be a PRF and let f * = S2V[f ]. Let A be an adversary that runs in time t and asks q ≥ 3 vector-valued queries, theueries having a total of p components and μ bits and each vector having fewer than n components. Then there exists an adversary B where
and B asksueries having a total of p components and μ bits and B runs in time t + c(μ + p + q) for some absolute constant c.
PRACTICAL USES OF S2V. In the next section we will use the S2V construction for sPRF-to-vPRF conversion to make a DAE scheme. But we point out that real-world security protocols already employ, implicitly, PRFs that operate on vectors of strings. They usually do this in a complex and inefficient manner. A good illustration is the TLS protocol; they define a PRF that operates on 2-vectors, the PRF defined in a complex and feedbackdependent way from HMAC-MD5 and HMAC-SHA1. Then, wanting to apply the PRF to vectors with more than two components, they concatenate logically-separate strings to form the second component. Similarly, IEEE 802.11r does key derivation by applying a PRF to input that includes long constants (host and user names) that remain fixed across many derivations. We suggest that when a security protocol wants to apply a PRF to what is logically a vector of strings the protocol should realize this with just such an abstraction. Concatenation should be avoided in achieving that abstraction (because it is, in general, both inefficient and wrong). The vPRF primitive should be realized in the protocol as a higher-level abstraction made from an sPRF.
The SIV Mode of Operation
SIV MODE. For n ≥ 64, fix an n-bit blockcipher E. Let Π = CTR be counter mode [27] over E. For concreteness and implementation convenience, let the increment function used for CTR mode be the addition of one modulo 2 n . Before any increments, again for implementation convenience (see below), let us zero-out the leftmost bit in each of the last two 32-bit words of the counter. (The loss of two bits of a random IV has inconsequential impact on the priv$-security of CTR mode.) Let F = CMAC * = S2V[CMAC] be the result of applying the S2V construction to CMAC [28] , with an underlying blockcipher of E. (Recall that CMAC [28] is a NIST-recommended CBC MAC variant with message space {0, 1} * .) Consider the scheme SIV[F, Π]. By combining Theorems 2 and 3 and known results about CMAC and CTR mode [3, 18] , the suggested mechanism is a provably secure DAE scheme assuming E is a secure PRP. The proven security falls off, as usual, in σ 2 /2 n where σ is the total number of blocks asked about. We overload the name SIV and call the mode of operation just described SIV mode. See Figure 5 for the specification. The addition operation shown there has the natural interpretation, modulo 2 n , while B & C denotes the bitwise-and of equal-length strings B and C. The only thing left unspecified in the definition of SIV mode is the underlying blockcipher E, which would typically be AES.
COMMENTS. Comparing SIV-AES and the X9.102 scheme AESKW, say, we note that, with SIV-AES, (1) the * message space and header space are now {0, 1} instead of unusual sets; (2) message expansion is now inde pendent of header length and message length; (3) the number of blockcipher calls is reduced by a factor of at least six; (4) vector-valued headers can now be handled, and the contribution of any component can be pre processed if it is to be held fixed; (5) one now has a provable-security guarantee, falling off in σ 2 /2 n , where σ is the total number of message blocks acted on. On the other hand, there is an effective attack on SIV if one can ask this many message blocks, while we do not know if this is true for AESKW.
In the instantiation of SIV we could have used, in place of CMAC, the composition of a universal hash function that gives n-bit outputs with an n-bit blockcipher. This demonstrates that the DAE goal can be achieved Figure 5 : The SIV mode of operation. The mechanism is the generic SIV scheme instantiated using CMAC * and CTR n n modes, each of these based on a blockcipher E:
by a single "cryptographic" pass over the plaintext, plus a universal-hash-function computation over the header and plaintext. Similarly, a parallelizable MAC like PMAC [10] could have been used in place of CMAC, illustrating that DAE can be achieved by a parallelizable scheme. And if all messages to be encrypted were of one length, that length being a positive multiple of the blocksize, then the raw CBC MAC could have replaced CMAC. Our earlier descriptions of SIV mode used a different incrementing function within CTR mode, multiplying by two in the finite field with 2 n points. We made this choice for reasons of economy of techniques: doubling in the finite field was already used within S2V, as well as in CMAC. But, in software, especially when coding in a high-level programming language, finite-field doubling is a little bit expensive to be doing with every n-bit word of plaintext. So we have switched to modulo 2 n increment, but where one first clears the most significant bit in each of the last two 32-bit words of the counter. This zeroing-out ensures that if |M | ≤ n2 31 bits (ie, 32 GBytes for n = 128) there can be no carry-out of the last 32-bit word, making an increment of Ctr (modulo 2 n ) equivalent to incrementing just its last 32-bit word (modulo 2 32 ). Similarly, if |M | ≤ n2 63 bits (as it invariably will be), an increment of Ctr (modulo 2 n ) is equivalent to incrementing its final 64 bits (modulo 2 64 ). Of course from a provable-security point of view, all of these details are irrelevant, since all reasonable instantiations of CTR mode will achieve essentially the same priv$-security.
Misuse-Resistant AE
This section gives an application of DAEs motivated not by the key-wrap problem but by the goal of construct ing symmetric encryption schemes that are resistant to misuse. We are specifically concerned with IV-misuse, meaning that the IV is used in a way other than the way mandated by the scheme; for example, using a counter when the scheme requires a random value, or repeating an IV when the scheme requires it to be a nonce. Ex perience has shown that IVs are frequently mishandled. An encryption scheme robust against misuse should at least be an AE scheme (as programmers, protocol designers, and even books often assume that encryption provides for authenticity) and so we will treat IV-misuse within the context of authenticated encryption and not privacy-only encryption. The notion is applicable to the latter context, too.
Designing an IV-based AE scheme that is secure when its IV is an arbitrary nonce-not just when it is a random value-is a first move in the direction of making schemes robust against IV-misuse. The current section takes this a step further; we aim for an AE scheme in which if the IV is a nonce then one achieves the usual notion for nonce-based AE; and if the IV does get repeated then authenticity remains and privacy is compromised only to the extent that some minimal amount of information may be revealed, the information being if this plaintext is equal to a prior one, and even that is revealed only if both the message and its header
have been used with this particular IV. Our formalization will capture this intent.
REVISED SYNTAX FOR AN IV-BASED ENCRYPTION SCHEME. Let us update the syntax of a conventional IV-based encryption scheme to accommodate an associated header. In this case an IV-based encryption scheme is a tuple Π = (K, E, D) where everything is as before except that the encryption algorithm and decryption * * * algorithm take an extra argument: now they are deterministic algorithms that map
There must be sets H, IV, and X such that E H,IV (X) ∈ {0, 1} K K iff H ∈ H and IV ∈ IV and X ∈ X . We call IV the IV space of Π. We require that
To measure the AE-security of an encryption scheme Π = (K, E, D) in the face of possible IV-reuse, imagine an adversary that may ask any sequence of encryption queries, even those that repeat IVs, and any sequence of decryption queries, which may likewise repeat IVs. We want the encryption oracle to return bits that look random except when this is impossible-on a repeated triple of (header, IV, message)-and the decryption oracle should return ⊥ except when the triple is already known to have a valid decryption. For simplicity, assume as before that our IV-based encryption scheme is length-preserving.
Definition 5 Let Π = (K, E, D)
be an IV-based encryption scheme that can handle an associated header and let A be an adversary. Then the MRAE-advantage of A in attacking Π is The MRAE-notion of security trivially implies nonce-based AE-scheme security: the latter is the special case where the adversary is not allowed to repeat an IV to any left query. Note that all proposed AE schemes to date [19, 21, 26, 29, 33] do fail should an IV get repeated: existing AE schemes are not MRAE-secure.
BUILDING A MISUSE-RESISTANT AE SCHEME. We can turn a DAE scheme Π = (K, E, D) with header space {0, 1} * * and message space X into a misuse-resistant AE scheme D , E, Π = (K D D D ) by regarding the IV as one of the components, say the last component, of the header. In particular, SIV mode can be regarded as an MRAE scheme by asserting that one of the header components, say the last one specified, is an IV.
CORRECTNESS. Correctness of the MRAE scheme described above is nearly immediate. Given an adversary A for breaking the misuse-resistant AE scheme (it distinguishes
adversary B runs A and maps left queries (H, IV, X) to queries ((H, IV ), X), and maps right queries (H, IV, Y ) to queries ((H, IV ) , Y ). The syntax and DAE-security notion for a PRI have been designed to "match up" so that there is nothing to do.
COMMENTS. Since all we have done in the construction is to hijack a component of the header as an IV, it seems as though nothing has actually been done. Yet the MRAE goal is conceptually different from the DAE goal, the former employing an IV and gaining for this a stronger notion of security. The header and the IV are conceptually different, the one being user-supplied data that the user wants authenticated, the other being a mechanism-supplied value needed to obtain a strong notion of security.
In retrospect, it is easy to construct an MRAE scheme by a sequence of simple steps. One can achieve this goal in a trivial way from a DAE scheme that takes a vector-valued header. Such a DAE scheme is easily built
from a vector-input PRF and an IND$-secure conventional encryption scheme. At least if one is unconcerned with optimizing efficiency, a vector-input PRF is easily made from a string-input PRF. String-input PRFs and IND$-secure conventional encryption schemes can be built from blockciphers by well-known means. So each step along our path is easy or well-known. Still, the direct construction of an MRAE or DAE scheme from a blockcipher is not a simple matter, as evidenced by the long history of buggy or baroque AE schemes Perhaps simple is how things seem after finding the right abstraction boundaries.
The PRI Characterization of DAE Security
A secure pseudorandom injection (PRI) resembles a random injective function with the desired amount of length-expansion. We allow a chosen-ciphertext attack in our definition (that is, we focus on a "strong" PRI, analogous to a strong PRP [24] ), giving the adversary both the forward and backward direction of the function. We allow the PRI to be tweakable [23] , so that the scheme can be used to authenticate an associated header. We allow the domain to be fairly arbitrary-in particular, we consider message spaces that contain strings of various lengths. Formally, let Π = (K, E, D) be a DAE with header space H and message space X . Imagine an adversary A given access to two oracles-one for E and one for D. We want to say that this pair looks just like a random injection f and its inverse f −1 , the random injection f having the same signature as E. Assuming a reasonable amount of stretch, the PRI and DAE notions of security are very close, as the following theorem shows.
Theorem 7
Let Π = (K, E, D) be a DAE with header space H, message space X , and stretch s, and let τ = min X∈X {|X|} be the length of a shortest plaintext. Let A be an adversary that asks at most q L left-oracle queries, q R right-oracle queries, for a total of q = q L + q R queries. Then
In other words, as the stretch s grows, the DAE and PRI notions converge. The quantitative difference be tween the measures is small if the stretch is, say, s = 128 bits. Among other reasons, it is to achieve this equivalence with PRIs that our definition for them used indistinguishability from random bits rather than, say, indistinguishability from the encryption of random bits.
Proof: Let A be an adversary that has access to two oracles. Let it ask q L queries of its left oracle and q R queries of its right oracle, and let q = q L + q R . With the obvious notational simplifications we have Figure 6 : Games used in the proof of Theorem 7. Game G1 is the complete code; game G0 omits the shaded statements.
for the games G0 and G1 defined in Figure 6 . Recall that booleans are initialized to false, sets are initial ized to empty, and partial functions are initialized to everywhere undefined with the symbol undef. The set Image(f (H, ·) ) contains all points Y � = undef such that f (H, X) = Y for some X ∈ X . Set difference is indicated with a minus sign. Look first at game G0. Game G1 is more subtle. We claim that its (left, right) oracles are simply a lazy evaluation of a pair of oracles (f, f −1 ) with the desired domain and range. To see this, understand first that the partial function f (H, ·) main tains the correspondence X � → f (H, X) for those domain points that we have already assigned values to, while the set Invalid H maintains the set of points Y that have become ineligible to be f (H, X) values, for any X, by virtue of having been asked right(H, Y ) and having returned ⊥, effectively asserting that f −1 (H, Y ) = ⊥ and so Y is outside the image of f (H, ·). Now, starting at left(H, X) queries, we begin at line 10 by calculating the length c of the ciphertext that we must return. The code at lines 11-14 returns a random string Y of length c subject to the constraint that Y is outside of the image of f (H, ·) and not ineligible to be an f (H, X) value by virtue of having asserted that there is no preimage for Y with tweak H. Looking next at right(H, Y ) queries, we calculate at line 21 the set EligibleX of values X that could possibly map to Y using tweak H, and we calculate at line 22 the set of strings Y that could, at this moment be paired with strings in EligibleX. By our conventions on the adversary making no "pointless" queries, the string Y will necessarily be among the strings in EligibleY . Since we aim to randomly and injectively pair points in EligibleX with points in EligibleY , the chance that a given point Y in EligibleY has a preimage in EligibleX is just |EligibleX|/|EligibleY |. Lines 23 and 24 effectively flip a coin with this bias, deciding if the string Y ∈ EligibleY should or should not be given a (random) preimage in EligibleX. If it is not given a preimage, we record this decision by augmenting Invalid H at line 26. If it is given a preimage, it is given a random one by lines 23-25, the choice is recorded, and the random preimage is returned. We have thus provided a perfect simulation of an (f, f −1 ) oracle, and so
| we can now invoke the fundamental lemma of game-playing [7] , since games G1 and G0 have been defined to be identical apart from the sequel of statements bad ← true.
The lemma assures us that
Let BAD be the event that A G0 causes bad to get set to true. We must bound the probability of BAD. Remem ber that the shaded statements have been expunged from the game. Prior to BAD occurring, each left-query adds a single point to a set Image(f (H, ·)) but has no impact on any set Invalid H , while each right-query adds a single point to a set Invalid H but has no impact on any set Image(f (H, ·) ). If the i th query is leftquery then the set Image(f (H, ·)) ∪ Invalid H will have at most i − 1 points and the chance that bad will get set at line 13 will be at most (i − 1)/2 s+τ and so, overall, the probability that bad gets set at line 13 
A Critique of the Draft X9.102 Standard
Review of the X9.102 proposal [13] motivated the current paper. The following summary comments on that proposal address the models/definitions it describes, and then each of its schemes.
MODELS AND DEFINITIONS. The specification document outlines an attack model and goal [13, Section 2] for the four key-wrap schemes. This is more then specs usually do, but the description is not very precise. � The stated security goals for AESKW, TDKW, and AKW1 are indistinguishability of ciphertexts [3, 15] under an adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack (IND-CCA2), and unforgeability of ciphertexts [8, 20] under an adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack. In effect, the goal would then be to provide authenticated-encryption [6, 8, 20] . But indistinguishability-at least as it is traditionally defined and understood-cannot be achieved by schemes AESKW and TDKW because they are deterministic and stateless; the usual formulation of indistinguishability demands that one conceal in a sequence of ciphertexts whether or not a given plaintext was encrypted twice. While deterministic encryption schemes have been considered in the literature, usually going under the name of a blockcipher or an enciphering scheme, security is typically understood to be in the sense of a pseudorandom permutation (PRP) [5, 24] and the scheme must therefore be length-preserving. � It is unnecessary to ask for indistinguishability and unforgeability under a chosen-ciphertext attack. Un forgeability under a chosen-plaintext attack implies unforgeability under a chosen-ciphertext attack, since the decryption oracle will only return a valid plaintext if it is asked a valid ciphertext, which is then a forgery. More over, a scheme that provides indistinguishability and unforgeability under a chosen-plaintext will automatically provide indistinguishability under a chosen-ciphertext attack [6, 20] . � The model section limits the number of key-wrapping oracle queries to 2 48 for AESKW and 2 32 for the other schemes. Where do these numbers come from? No limit is placed on the total lengths of all queries (beyond that which can be inferred by using maximal-length messages), but one expects that a security proof, if it existed, would show a dependency on that. 
// each P j of length 64 � The definitional suggestions for AKW2 in [13, Section 2.4] are weak in focusing on random plaintexts. It would seem that a definition only needs to make the first block of the message be random, and even this block does not need to be hidden from the adversary. to this scheme. In summary, a more precise definition would be desirable. For AESKW, TDKW, and a deterministic version of AKW1, we advocate a PRI as the desired notion. For AKW2, a specialized notion of security is required. We sketch one following our subsequent comments on AKW2.
THE AESKW AND TDKW SCHEMES. Encryption under AESKW is a deterministic function that maps a key K, a bit string X, an octet string H, and a six-byte integrity check vector ICV into a ciphertext a little longer than the sum of the lengths of |X| and |H|. The mechanism uses an apparently new six-round Feistel network variant; see Figure 7 . We comment: � The description of AESKW/TDKW in [13] is very awkward. The specification does not indicate the en cryption and decryption signature; the length restriction on input X is not clearly stated (restrictions are stated on derived strings); plaintext formatting is viewed as a separate mechanism from encryption rather than a part of it; integrity-checking is viewed as a separate mechanism from decryption rather than a part of it; integrity checking is described before the encryption method is described; the algorithm specification repeatedly re names variables; and the provided picture does little to illustrate the algorithm's actual structure. Extracting the definition and drawing of Figure 7 took much work. � The message space is unnatural; one can encrypt bit strings up to 2 38 − 64 bits? Algorithms should be designed to work on "natural" message spaces. Similarly, the restriction that either X is nonempty or H is nonempty is unnatural; what's allowed for header should be independent of what's allowed for a message. � The length of the ciphertext increases with the length of the header. This goes against the notion of a header, which should be authenticated but not encrypted. It would be preferable if the ciphertext length were independent of the header length. In addition, the length of the ciphertext increases by at least eight bytes and at most 16 bytes minus one bit. It would be preferable if the length increased by exactly eight bytes regardless of the length of the message. � It is not clear what is the intended semantics of "prerequisites"-is the ICV under the adversary's control or not? We interpret that the ICV should be treated definitionally just like the header. � There is a mixture of bit-orientation and byte-orientation in the spec. It seems preferable to make everything bit strings or make everything byte strings. � The xoring of the counter 6t + i into the blockcipher output is not explained; why is this done?
� The mechanism would be more natural if it reversed the most-significant 64-bits and the least-significant 64-bits in each AES call; that is, replace AES(P i+1 I P i ) at line 15 of Figure 7 by AES(P i I P i+1 ) or, alternatively, replace P i I P i+1 by P i+1 I P i . The current convention looks odd in the pseudocode and seems to make it impossible to draw a picture of the mechanism with a small number of wire crossings without establishing peculiar conventions. � The string X will be "misaligned" (not fall on a word boundary) if H is of non-word length. This would cause unnecessary inefficiency in typical implementations. It seems preferable if mechanisms don't disrupt the alignment of H and X in doing internal work. � The number of blockcipher calls seems large: roughly 12 per block of data (the same price paid for X or H). This is six times more than that used for AKW1. � Even if the header H is held fixed, one must spend time (as well as bits) to re-authenticate it with each message that is encrypted or decrypted. � There is no proof of security, and the mechanism is so complex that providing one would be difficult.
The above criticism notwithstanding, we find it likely that the mechanism is correct. Namely, the modified Feistel network illustrated in Figure 7 is, we conjecture, a secure enciphering scheme (in the sense of a strong, variable-input-length PRP). Scheme AESKW is then seen as an instance of the PTE paradigm, except that the header is folded into the plaintext instead of used to tweak the enciphering scheme.
Our comments on AESKW apply equally to TDKW. But for TDKW we appreciate the use of a multiround Feistel network more, for it is more important to go beyond mechanisms that have security degrading in σ 2 /2 η , where η is the blockcipher blocksize and σ is the total number of blocks acted on. The modified Feistel network used here probably does have security (as a strong PRP) better than σ 2 /2 η , but it would be hard to prove. THE AKW1 SCHEME. We recreate an illustration of the AKW1 scheme in Figure 8 . High-level comments about the mechanism are as follows. � Whereas AESKW and TDKW are deterministic and stateless, and therefore have no chance to achieve semantic security [3, 15] , algorithm AKW1 is probabilistic and can achieve that goal; it would seem to be a probabilistic AE scheme [6, 8, 20] . � But as a probabilistic AE scheme, AKW1 is highly atypical. It does not employ generic composition, nor is it obtained by optimizing a generic-composition scheme, nor does it employ techniques associated to one-pass AE. Furthermore, it is straightforward to achieve AE using two blockcipher calls per block, but AKW1 uses, beyond that, an application of SHA1. Why did the designers choose such an odd and comparatively expensive design? Perhaps the scheme wasn't actually meant to be "just" an AE scheme; maybe it should work even if the random-number generator used to make the IV fails (cf. [13, page 3, item 2]). But if one regards the IV as part of the header and looks to see if the resulting algorithm is a secure DAE scheme, the answer is no; for an attack, Figure 8 : Encryption under AKW1. The boxes are TDEA, all keyed by the underlying encryption key, and the ovals reverse the bytes of their eight-byte inputs. The value Const = 0x4adda22c79e82105 is a fixed eight-byte string. The string IV is a random eight-byte string. The value ICV = Hash(X 1 X 2 X 3 X 4 ) is the first 64 bits of SHA1(X 1 X 2 X 3 X 4 ).
find 64-bit strings A and B such that Hash(A) = Hash(B) (this takes about 2 32 time) and then notice that the encryption of (A, A) and (B, B) will have the same first block Y 1 , which violates the goal of a DAE scheme. Perhaps the scheme is intended to function as a deterministic AE scheme when IV = 0 n , say. Probably the best explanation for the odd structure of AKW1 is that there is no explanation, according to a participant, and as revealed by the S/MIME working group's mail log, the scheme grew by accretion, with different people having their own goals and ideas, with no underlying design rationale. � The constraint that the input to the algorithm must be a positive multiple of 64 bits seems an unfortunate limitation for a general-purpose algorithm. � The lack of a header/associated-data is a significant limitation for a general-purpose PRI or AE scheme. � The byte-reversal operations seem gratuitous; what is their purpose? � There is no provable security result associated to AKW1. � The AKW1 mechanism resembles CMC [16] , which is a tweakable, proven-secure, wide-blocksize blockci pher. The paradigm of adding redundancy (even 0-bits) to a wide-blocksize blockcipher and then enciphering is the PTE construction of this paper. This suggests one way to eliminate the hash function and obtain a provablesecure construction at the same time.
THE AKW2 SCHEME. We recreate an illustration of the AKW2 scheme in Figure 9 . � The AKW2 mechanism is deterministic, but the goal cannot be that of a secure PRI, or even deterministic indistinguishability detPriv, since encryption of plaintext block i does not impact any prior ciphertext block. As a consequence, ciphertexts leak equality of prefixes: the encryption of (H, P ) and (H ' , P ' ) reveals the length of the longest block-aligned prefix of P and P ' , assuming the first blocks of H and H ' agree. � There is no provable-security claim associated to the mode, and the key-separation method used in AKW2 precludes the possibility of proving security relative to a standard assumption. Provable security could be
E K2 E K2 E K2 E K2 E K2 E K2 Figure 9 : Encryption under AKW2. The header is H 1 H 2 H 3 and the message is P 1 P 2 P 3 P 4 . The boxes are TDEA, where the first row is keyed by the confidentiality subkey K = K ⊕ 0x4545454545454545 and the second row is keyed by authentication subkey K = K ⊕ 0x4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d, where K is the underlying key. The ciphertext is
pursued by regarding the key as K ' I K '' , or it is easy to describe a (nonstandard) assumption under which the style of key separation used by the mode works. � The SIV construction of this paper is an alternative design approach having similar efficiency characteristics and that does achieve PRI-security. Let us consider how to define security for this mode. Begin with privacy. For b ∈ {0, 1} the adversary is given an oracle Enc1 b that behaves as follows: on receipt of (H, 
K
Let us assume that AKW2 actually achieves security in the detPriv1+auth sense. Then one can distill out a simple and concrete usage restriction that could be stated in the mechanism's documentation: the first block of plaintext P 1 should be random. This may be a reasonable restriction for a key-wrapping mechanism.
B All-in-One vs. Two-Requirement Notions for AE
An alternative approach for defining DAE-security is to specify a notion for deterministic privacy, detPriv, a notion for deterministic authenticity, detAuth, and demand both. This "two-requirement" approach is the one that has been taken in all prior work on AE. In this section we specify the two-requirement definition for DAE and show where it leads: to a notion equivalent to our "all-in-one" definition. We go on to recall prior variants for AE security and explain that, in each case, the two-requirement definition is equivalent to the all-in-one
DETERMINISTIC PRIVACY. We adapt the indistinguishability-from-random-bits notion of privacy [32] to the setting where the encryption scheme takes an header. Fix a DAE scheme Π = (K, E, D) with header space H and message space X . Then, for A an adversary, define its detPriv-advantage in attacking Π as
where we assume that A does not repeat a query. Informally, adversary A is trying to determine if its oracle is enciphering its queries or returning random bits, and the trivial way to make that determination is barred.
DETERMINISTIC AUTHENTICITY. The usual notion of integrity of ciphertexts [6, 8, 20] must be adapted to the deterministic setting (the difference is just a matter of syntax). Let Π = (K, E, D) be a DAE with header space H and message space X , and consider an adversary A with access to oracles for E K and D K . We define A's detAuth-advantage in attacking Π as
Above, when we say that A forges it means that it asks a right-query (H, Y ) and gets a response other than ⊥, and A did not earlier ask a left-query (H, X) that returned Y . We assume without loss of generality that A never asks a right-query (H, Y ) having already asked a left-query (H, X) that returned Y .
EQUIVALENCE OF DETPRIV+DETAUTH-SECURITY AND DAE-SECURITY.
Here we show that our all-in-one notion of DAE security is equivalent to the two-part notion that requires detPriv and detAuth.
Proposition 8 [detPriv+detAuth implies DAE] Let Π = (K, E, D)
be a DAE with header space H and mes sage space X . Let A be an adversary with access to two oracles. Suppose A runs in time t and asks q L queries to its left oracle, these totaling μ L bits, and asks q R queries to its right oracle, these totaling μ R bits. Then there exist adversaries D and F such that
and asks q L queries totaling μ L bits, and
asking at most q L left-queries and one right-query, these totaling at most μ L + μ R bits.
Proof: Let D g operate by running A, answering left oracle queries (H, X) with g(H, X), and responding to all right oracle queries with ⊥. When A halts with output bit b, let D return b. Then
; it remains to bound this quantity. Let E be the event that A asks at least one valid right-oracle
where the last equality holds since, if E does not occur, all right-oracle queries are answered by ⊥ whether A had been provided with a D K (·, ·) oracle or a ⊥(·, ·) oracle. Conditioning on event E we obtain
It must be the case that Pr[E j ] ≥ δ/q R for some j. Fix this value of j and let F be the following forging adversary. Adversary F runs A, answering all of A's left-oracle queries with its own E K oracle, and answering the first j − 1 of A's right-oracle queries with ⊥. When A asks its j th right oracle
and we are done.
Π Π
Proposition 9 [DAE implies detPriv+detAuth] Let Π = (K, E, D)
be a DAE with header space H and mes sage space X . Let D be a detPriv-adversary that runs in time t and asksueries to its oracle, these totaling μ ' bits. Let F be a detAuth-adversary that runs in time t ' and asksueries totaling μ ' bits. Then there exists adversaries A and A ' such that
where A runs in time t and asks at mostueries totaling μ bits, and where A ' runs in time t ' and asks at ' mostueries totaling μ ' bits.
Proof:
The first result is trivial, so we do not bother with it. The second is also simple. Let A run F , answering left-oracle queries with its left oracle (either E K (·, ·) or $(·, ·)) and right-oracle queries with its right oracle
If any right oracle query returns a value other than ⊥ then let A output 1; otherwise, it outputs 0. Notice that
since in the latter case the right oracle always returns ⊥.
ALL-IN-ONE AND TWO-REQUIREMENT NOTIONS FOR AE ARE INVARIABLY EQUIVALENT.
There are now several variants of AE: the encryption scheme may be probabilistic, nonce-based, deterministic, or misuseresistant; the privacy requirement can be indistinguishability from random bits or conventional indistinguisha bility; and message headers may be present or absent, strings or vectors. For any of these variants one can give a two-requirement definition or an all-in-one definition. In all cases the results come out as above, showing that the all-in-one definition and the two-requirement definition are equivalent. As a first example, the indistinguishability-from-random-bits notion of privacy we selected for detPriv and within DAE can be relaxed to conventional indistinguishability, formalized, say, by indistinguishability from the encryption of random bits. Each oracle $(·, ·) gets changed to a E K (·, $ |·| ) oracle that encrypts as many random bits as the message-portion of its query is long. The all-in-one and two-requirements definitions will again be equivalent, with a proof just as before.
As a second example, consider probabilistic AE, no headers, privacy in the sense of conventional indistin guishability. The usual two-requirement definition [6, 8, 20] would specify
and a good AE scheme would have to be secure in both of these senses. Then all-in-one definition would define
where the adversary may not ask a right-query of C after this is returned by a left-query. It is again simple to show that the all-in-one definition and the two-requirement one are equivalent (where, as before, the all-in-one notion will have quantitatively tighter authenticity).
In general, we prefer the all-in-one definitions for authenticated-encryption, finding them more aesthetic and concise.
AE AS A FORM OF CHOSEN-CIPHERTEXT SECURITY. All-in-one definitions for AE resemble the definition for chosen-ciphertext-attack (CCA2) security [3, 4] : in the definition just given, say, change the ⊥(·) oracle to a D K (·) oracle to recover the CCA2 notion for the same setting. The definition of AE thus strengthens CCA2 security in a simple and natural way. Perhaps it is only "historical accident" that our community came to think of AE as privacy+authenticity and not as "CCA3 security."
C DAEs Achieve Semantic Security when Plaintexts Carry a Key
A folklore justification for using a key-wrap scheme instead of a probabilistic, semantically secure encryption scheme is that, in the key-wrap setting, one expects the plaintext to carry a random cryptographic key, and so a probabilistic encryption scheme ought not be needed. In this section we provide a result that validates this intuition. We show that encoding a random key into the plaintext (the key may be dropped into the message in any fashion) and then applying a DAE will achieve what amounts to probabilistic AE-in particular, it achieves what amounts to semantic security. We begin with some definitions.
KEY INSERTION. A key-insertion scheme is a pair of algorithms Φ = (InsertKey, ExtractKey). The first algorithm is used to insert a key into a plaintext and the second algorithm is used to extract it. For the remainder, fix a constant κ, the length of the key to be inserted. Algorithm InsertKey, on input of X ∈ {0, 1} * , chooses a $ $ random R ← {0, 1} κ and, depending on |X|, returns either M ← InsertKey(X) ∈ {0, 1} * or the distinguished value ⊥. An equivalent viewpoint is that InsertKey is a deterministic function that takes as input a string X ∈ {0, 1} * and a random string R ∈ {0, 1} κ ; then we write M ← InsertKey(X, R). The set of all strings X such $ that M ← InsertKey(X) is a string is called the message space of Φ. We insist that if M = InsertKey(X, R) is a string then |M | = |X| + e(|X|) for some fixed expansion function e. (Recall that we have fixed the key length κ and so, implicitly, the expansion depends on κ = |R| as well as on |X|.) Algorithm ExtractKey takes a string M ∈ {0, 1} * and, depending on |M |, returns either ⊥ or the encoding of a pair of strings (X, R) with
To simplify the subsequent theorem statement and capture the intent that InsertKey and ExtractKey are simple mappings, we require that they be computable in linear time.
INSERTKEY-THEN-DAE ENCRYPTION. Let Φ = (InsertKey, ExtractKey) be a key-insertion scheme with message space X , image M, and key length κ. Let Π = (K, E, D) be a DAE with header space H and message space M. We define from Φ and Π the probabilistic encryption scheme
The encryption scheme Π D is nonstandard insofar as decryption of a ciphertext Y returns not only the underlying plaintext X but also the random bits R that were inserted (algorithm ExtractKey returns such a pair). The formalization should not be interpreted as meaning that the encrypting party that does not "know" R-indeed if it follows the algorithm above then it chooses R and therefore knows it. The return value from encrypt does not include R because the ciphertext that is to be sent to the receiver already incorporates it. On the other hand, the decryption algorithm does return R, as this value is conceptually a part of the plaintext. We must correspondingly strengthen the notion of security, providing the random bits R to the attacker. To do this, we must adapt the definition of AE. Consider an encryption oracle E K (·, ·) that behaves exactly as the encryption algorithm in Π D , above, but returns the random string R as part of the ciphertext. Specifically, on input (H, X),
where H ∈ H and X ∈ X , it computes:
, and then returns an encoded string (R, Y ). Let oracle $(·, ·), on input (H, X), where H ∈ H and X ∈ X , operate identically to
Basically, when the adversary asks for the encryption of X we embellish the string to (X, R) for a random key R, inform the adversary of the random key that was inserted, and give the adversary the resulting ciphertext. We are saying that this looks like random bits, even in the presence of a decryption oracle. As usual, the adversary may not ask a right-query (H, C) following a left-query (H, M ) that returned C. We emphasize that the KIAE-notion is in effect the usual notion for probabilistic AE as it must be interpreted for a key-insertion scheme; some change is essential because, if nothing else, the syntax of a scheme has changed. But we have given the adversary all the abilities it would normally have in the probabilistic AE setting, and have taken away nothing. The adversary cannot specify the inserted key-that it does not controlbut it learns the inserted key and it is otherwise in full control of the plaintexts.
INSERTKEY-THEN-DAE ACHIEVES KIAE. We now show that as long as the inserted key is "long enough" the InsertKey-then-DAE scheme achieves the version of probabilistic authenticated-encryption we have defined. 
where A runs in time at most t ' = t+O(μ), and asks at most q =ueries of total length at most μ ' = μ+O(q).
� �

Adv kiae
Proof: Let δ = (B) and let E * (·, ·) be an oracle that behaves exactly as E, except that it never uses D K Π the same random string R twice. Now, suppressing obvious notation, we have
where the inequality holds because the observable behavior of E and E * differs only when the former uses twice some randomly chosen string R, and this happens with probability at most q 2 /2 κ (by the sum bound).
To bound the probability p, we construct a DAE adversary A g,h that will run B and faithfully simulate either the pair of oracles 
where, as before, we have bounded the probability of an R-repeat (ie,BAD) by q 2 /2 κ . Rearranging to p ≤ Adv dae (A) + q 2 /2 κ , and putting it all together, we have Adv
Noting that the InsertKey is computed in linear time (necessary for the time bound t ' , the theorem follows.
D Building a DAE Scheme: The PTE Constructions
A folklore approach for achieving authenticity is to add redundancy and then encrypt, an approach investigated in works like [1, 8] . One pads the plaintext (for example, by appending a particular number of zero-bits) and then applies a length-preserving enciphering scheme (that is, a wide-blocksize blockcipher, like CMC [16] ). We call this the pad-then-encipher (PTE) approach.
To accommodate an associated header under this paradigm either (a) use it as a tweak for the enciphering scheme, or (b) incorporate it into the plaintext before enciphering. The former will be more efficient in terms of the length of the resulting ciphertext, but it requires the underlying enciphering scheme to be tweakable.
Three of the four X9.102 key-wrap schemes (AESKW, TDKW, and AKW1) can be seen as instances of pad then-encipher (although they use enciphering schemes for which there has been offered no proof of security). In this section we formalize and prove security for pad-then-encipher, for both options (a) and (b). 
Theorem 11 tells us that if Π is a an enciphering scheme that is secure in the PRI sense, then Π D is a secure length-increasing DAE. In the proof, we will make use of the notation Perm 
Let B be a DAE-adversary that runs in time t, asks q L left-queries, these of total length μ L bits, and asks q R right-queries, these of total length μ R bits. Let q = q L +q R and μ = μ L + μ R . Then there exists an adversary A such that
where A runs in time t + O(μ) and asksueries of total length μ + O(q). Recall that A's oracles are instantiated either as 
where α = Pr B − Pr and, throughout, K ← K and π ← Perm(M) are understood. It remains to bound the information-theoretic quantity α.
We will show that α 1 ≤ 2q R /2 s and α 2 ≤ q L /2 s+τ +1 , establishing the claim.
For bounding α 1 we can assume that adversary B halts and outputs 1 as soon as some right-oracle query returns a valid string. Let BAD be the event B asks a right-oracle query that returns a string X. n Fix an n ≥ 0 such that {0, 1} ⊂ M * and let
On query left(H, X):
27 return ⊥ Figure 10 : Games used to bound α 2 in the proof of Theorem 12. Game G1 is the complete code; game G0 omits the shaded statement.
Since the padding scheme has stretch s, we know that V(n)/2 n ≤ 2 −s for all n. At the time of the i th right oracle query, adversary B can know at most q L valid encipherings under E D π . Since B is forbidden to ask (H, Y ) of its right oracle if some left-oracle query (H, X) returned Y , the probability that U i occurs is at most
If V(n) = 0 this probability is zero (which is certainly less than the claimed upperbound), so assume that
. Consider the games G1 and G0 in Figure 10 . Recall that booleans are initialized to false, sets are initialized to empty, and partial functions are initialized to everywhere undefined with the symbol undef. The set Image(π) contains all points Y � = undef such that π(M * ) = Y for some M ∈ M * . Set difference is indicated with a minus sign. Both games G1 and G0 simulate a ⊥ oracle on the right. We claim that game G1 faithfully simulates an E D π oracle on the left, while game G0 faithfully simulates an $ left oracle. Let's examine what happens when a left query (H, X) is made. The result of Pad(Encode(H, X)) is assigned to M * , and if M * = ⊥, then ⊥ is returned. Since oracles are always defined to return ⊥ when queried outside of their domains, this is consistent with both E D π and $. A random string of c = |M * | bits is then selected and assigned to Y . If Y is in Image(π), then the flag bad is set to true; here is where the games begin to behave differently. In game G1, to observe the permutivity of π, a new point is selected from among the unused c-bit strings, and this is subsequently assigned to π(M * ) and returned. Game G0, on the other hand, continues on with the uniform value Y , ultimately returning it.
Under our convention that adversaries not repeat queries, it is clear that
Moreover, since these games are identical until bad is set, we can invoke the fundamental lemma of gameplaying [7] and state that α 2 ≤ Pr[B G0 sets bad]. Now, prior to bad being set in game G0, each left query adds a single point to Image(π). Accordingly, the probability that bad is set on the i th query is at most (i − 1)/2 s+τ , 2 so the probability that it is ever set is at most q L /2 s+τ +1 and we are done.
E Proof of Security for S2V
Proof: Consider the game S0 defined in Figure 11 . The game is a faithful simulation of F = f * . The intuition underlying this formulation of F is as follows. We grow a random function ρ to compute ρ(X 1 ), . . . , ρ(X m−1 ) ' for each query (X 1 , . . . , X m ), and we grow a separate random function ρ for the final call ρ(T ). But whenever we need a value ρ(I) we force it to take on the value ρ ' (I) if the latter has already been defined, and whenever we need a value ρ ' (I) we force it to take on the value ρ(I) if the latter has already been defined, but if either all values returned to the adversary are returned at line 119. The n-bit strings, call them Z 1 , . . . , Z q , that are ' returned to the adversary and placed into the range of ρ have no impact on the running of the game-they are never even referred to-what matters is the domain of ρ ' , not its range. Thus one could let the adversary choose whatever return values it likes as Z 1 , . . . , Z q and it would not matter in the setting of bad. Now as for the no-argument query, we let the adversary choose the value C = f K (1) that is best for it, along with an optimal sequence of queries X 1 , . . . , X q (each query X t = (X 1 t , . . . , X t ) ∈ {0, 1} * * ) for the adversary to ask having mt total length of at most μ bits. Fixing all of these values, Game S1 has now been reduced to the non-interactive Game S2 that is specified in Figure 11 .
Examining game S2, notice that points are added into the domain of ρ only at line 200, where ρ gets defined ' at 0 and 1, and at line 205, when ρ gets defined at X t . Points are added into the domain of ρ only at line 210,
when ρ is defined at T t . Thus bad gets set to true in exactly the following situations: at line 204, when an X t i value is equal to some T s value for some s < t; at line 208, when a T t value is equal to an X r value for i some r ≤ t and 1 ≤ i < m r ; at line 208, when a T t value is equal to 0 or 1; and at line 209, when a T t value is equal to a T s value for some s < t. Recalling that p is the assumed total number of vector components, we see that, all in all, there are a total of: (p − q)q pairs (T t , X r which, if equal, set bad; q pairs (T t , 0) which, i ) ) w q if equal, set bad; q pairs (T t , 1) which, if equal, set bad; and pairs (T t , T s ), for s < t, which, if equal, set 2 bad. In a moment we will show that for each of these pairs the probability that the first and second components are equal is at most 2 −n . Given this, we can conclude that the probability that bad gets set is in game S2 at most ) ) ww q (p − q)q + 2q + · 2 −n . This value is at most pq for q ≥ 3, the result we want.
2 Now, to show that each of the specified pairs collide with probability at most 2 −n we first rewrite game S2 as game S3, which makes its random choices up front and checks for domain collisions (ie., when bad begin set to true in game s2) at the end. Then, in game S4, we unroll the loop to more explicitly specify T t . Now our job is to show that, for any valid r, s, t, i, each of the four equalities at line 405, namely, (Case 1) T t = X r and i (Case 2) T t = 0 and (Case 3) T t = 1 and (Case 4) T t = T s , the equality holds with probability at most 2 −n . differ in some bit before their last n bits then the above probability is again zero (because of the behavior of ⊕ end ) and we are done. Hence there is no loss of generality to assume that |X r | = |X t | = n; just strip away i mt the leading, irrelevant prefix. The probability we wish to bound is then for some u ≥ 0 and where C 1 , . . . , C u are distinct strings different from 1 and where each c i = 0 � . As every ρ(I) value is random with the exception of ρ(1), the above probability is at most 2 −n . We must separately examine the subcases that m t � s + 1 and m t = m + 1. In the former subcase, we again = m s gather together terms that coincide and write the probability as where C 1 , . . . , C u are distinct strings different from 1 (all ρ(1) terms are included in B). We must argue that one of the c i � � To see this, notice that the xor of coefficients that = 0; in particular, we will show that c 0 = 0. describes c 0 contains 2 ms and 2 mt−1 = � 2 ms , and that one of these is a term of greatest degree. The inequality holds because we have restricted both m t and m s to be less than n. Hence the string c 0 contains at least one nonzero bit, and it follows that Once more, gather together terms that coincide and write the probability as both m t and m s to be less than n, there can be no wrap-around of the coefficients 2 i , and so the string c u contains at least one nonzero bit. It follows that the probability in question is 2 −n . 
F Key Rap
Mihir Bellare has asked why key wrap needs that apparently superfluous w, inspiring this appendix. 1 Yo! We'z gonna' take them keys Now NIST and X9 After wrappin' them keys an' whatever you pleaze and their friends at the fort gonna' help out some losers We gonna' wrap 'em all up suggest that you stick it chronic IV abusers looks like some ran'om gup in a six-layer torte don't read no directions Make somethin' gnarly and funky S/MIME has a scheme risk a deadly infection won't fool no half-wit junkie there's even one more If a rusty IV's drippin' into yo' veins So the game's like AE So many ways and ya never do manage but there's one major hitch that it's hard to keep score to get it exchanged No coins can be pitched And maybe they work Then we got ya somethin' there's no state to enrich and maybe they're fine and it comes at low cost the IV's in a ditch but I want some proofs When you screw up again dead drunk on cheap wine for spendin' my time not all 'ill be lost
